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noch ausschließen. Das Urheberrecht bleibt bei den Autoren. 
 
Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt • Problem Perception and Public Expectations in International Institutions iii
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Wahrnehmung von Problemen und gesellschaftliche Erwartungen an 
Internationale Institutionen: Befunde einer Repräsentativumfrage in Deutschland 
 
Viele Arbeiten zum „politischen Kosmopolitismus“ begründen ihre Präferenz für 
starke internationale Institutionen mit deren Fähigkeit transnationale Probleme 
besser zu lösen. Überraschender Weise hat die Frage bislang kaum wissenschaft-
liche Aufmerksamkeit erfahren inwiefern die Bürger ähnlich denken. Das Papier 
leitet Thesen zu Struktur und Bedingungen eines solchen „öffentlichen politi-
schen Kosmopolitismus“ ab und testet sie mit Hilfe einer Repräsentativumfrage 
deutscher Bürger. Es wird gezeigt, dass deren Einstellungen tatsächlich einem 
„Interdependenzmodell“ kosmopolitisischer Politisierung folgen. Die Wahrneh-
mung transnationaler Interdependenz (sowohl im Sinne funktionaler wie auch 
moralischer Bindungen) fördert Überzeugungen, dass internationale Institutio-
nen in der Lage sind daraus resultierende Probleme zu lösen. Das Interdepen-
denzmodell zeigt auch über verschiedene Bildungsniveaus ein hohes Maß an 
Erklärungskraft und widerspricht damit der herrschenden Lehrmeinung, der 
zufolge kognitive Mobilisierung eine kritische Bedingung für kosmopolitischer 
Politisierung darstellt. Bemerkenswerter Weise, sind die im Interdependenzmo-
dell spezifizierten Zusammenhänge zudem kaum von variierenden Graden 
subjektiver Vulnerabilität abhängig, d.h. der Wahrnehmung mangelnder Prob-
lemlösungsfähigkeit des Nationalstaats. 
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Abstract 
 
Problem Perception and Public Expectations in International Institutions: Evidence 
from a German Representative Survey 
 
Much of what can be subsumed under the label of “political cosmopolitanism” 
argues that some internationalization of political authority is desirable because 
of the superior capability of international institutions in solving transnational 
problems. Surprisingly, however, few scholars have asked whether ordinary 
citizens share this way of thinking. To address this question, falsifiable hypothe-
ses about the quality and scope conditions of such a “public political cosmopol-
itanism” are derived from the literature and tested using the results of a repre-
sentative survey of German citizens. I show that there is significant support for 
what I call the “interdependence model” of cosmopolitan politicization: German 
citizens’ perception of transnational interdependencies (in terms of functional 
sensitivity as well as moral commitments) fosters beliefs in the capability of 
international institutions to solve problems. This model has significant explana-
tory power over different levels of education, and thus disproves a common 
claim that cognitive mobilization is a crucial scope condition of cosmopolitan 
politicization. Remarkably, however, the relationships specified by the interde-
pendence model are only marginally moderated by German citizens’ sense of 
their own vulnerability, i.e. their beliefs that the national government is incapa-
ble of solving such problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Academics and politicians have argued time and again that globalization has 
severely weakened the capacities of nation states to regulate social transactions 
and has made international institutions an attractive and viable alternative in 
times of “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1977, Zürn 2002). Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, proponents of political cosmopolitanism (Held 1995, 
Falk 1995, Habermas 1998, Beitz 1999, Bohman 1999, Pogge 2001, Archibugi 
2004, Beck 2006) agree that a democratic world order needs international insti-
tutions in order to provide global common goods such as security, wealth, justice 
and knowledge. But whether ordinary citizens share this way of thinking about 
the comparative advantage of internationalized governance in a globalized world 
has, surprisingly, rarely attracted the attention of empirical studies. This is 
problematic for normative as well as theoretical reasons. 
From the normative view of political cosmopolitanism, the creation of powerful 
global institutions is not desirable at all if it means that people are merely 
subjugated under an inaccessible global technocracy (Archibugi 2004: 459). To 
uphold normative aspirations like autonomy, non-domination or consent, 
democratic procedures are needed (Held 1995); but democratic procedures alone 
cannot prevent the growth of an autocratic world order without a global citi-
zenry willing and capable of holding empowered institutions accountable (Falk 
1995, Grant and Keohane 2005). In this way, the idea of democratizing global 
governance ultimately requires a significant level of global public political 
cosmopolitanism, roughly defined as support for a significant internationalization 
of political authority. Moreover, the manner in which ordinary people reason 
about why and under what conditions a global level of political authority is 
desirable should be “cosmopolitan” in order to confirm the hope of some politi-
cal philosophers’ that one can generate “a bottom-up movement while proposing 
a top-down strategy” (Urbinati 2003: 75, similarly Calhoun 2003)—and this for 
two reasons. First, even if one were to accept global institutions preceding a 
cosmopolitan citizenry for some protracted span of time, the idea of cosmopoli-
tan democracy would gain in persuasive power by presenting empirical evidence 
that such a citizenry is in fact “in the making” (Archibugi 2004: 462) through an 
ongoing process of cosmopolitan politicization—a process that is capable of 
bringing about public political cosmopolitanism in the foreseeable future. 
Second, cosmopolitanism’s preference for “congruence” and “subsidiarity” 
implies a problem-specific attribution of political authority in a multi-level 
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setting, depending—inter alia—on the capability of (the lowest level of) institu-
tions to solve problems. Consequently, public political cosmopolitanism has less 
to do with support for internationalized governance per se than with a specific 
logic of attributing political authority to different levels of a multi-level-
governance. 
Following this line of argument, I consider one of the core rationales of current 
cosmopolitan writing for why international institutions are desirable and ask 
whether citizens reason about global governance in this same way: that is, that 
the world has become an interdependent unit in which major problems (bads) 
and opportunities (goods) are transnational (regional or even global) in scope and 
that this quality of interdependence makes international institutions a desirable 
component of world polity. This rationale defines the baseline of what I call the 
“interdependence model” of cosmopolitan politicization. Moreover, in accordance 
with current cosmopolitan thinking, the public definition of political problems is 
expected to follow two distinct, though not necessarily exclusive, logics, namely, 
(i) the logic of functional interdependence, hinging on the perception of ecologi-
cal, economic and social systems as global in scope and (ii) the logic of normative 
interdependence, characterized by universalism and perceptions of global 
responsibilities. 
Both logics, I contend, are the key to understanding how different forms of 
“subjective globalization” (Robertson 1992) might engender public political 
cosmopolitanism minimally defined. In this way, an empirical test of whether 
these two logics hold with respect to citizens’ attitudes is of more than norma-
tive interest: it also fills a void in theorizing about public attitudes toward 
internationalized governance in more generalized terms. Current literature on 
relevant attitudes is mostly descriptive and refer to cosmopolitan variables—e.g. 
a sense of global belonging or support for certain institutions—as facets of a 
complex attitudinal syndrome (Norris 2000, Furia 2005, Mau et al. 2008). But 
looking for empirical relationships might tell us important things about the 
underlying mechanism and help us to reach a theoretically grounded under-
standing of political attitudes in a globalized world. 
This paper is structured as follows: First, existing literature on political cos-
mopolitanism is summarized and set in the context of current research on 
changing attitudes toward globalization and political institutions. I then proceed 
from this discussion to consider various hypotheses about the possible link 
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between interdependence perceptions and beliefs in the problem solving capa-
bilities of international institutions—what I call the interdependence model—
and test these hypotheses using the results of a representative survey of German 
citizens conducted in 2008. I show that there is significant support for the 
interdependence model of cosmopolitan politicization. German citizens’ percep-
tions of transnational interdependencies and the capability of global institutions 
to solve problems are indeed positively related (even among the less well edu-
cated). Moreover, the relationship is to some extent conditioned by vulnerability, 
i.e. the belief that the efficiency of the nation state at problem solving is low. 
Nevertheless, results for the European level diverge from expectations, suggest-
ing that relationships implied by the interdependence model may not hold 
consistently over different levels of internationalized governance. 
2. How cosmopolitans define the demand for international 
institutions 
Why should people support the delegation of decision making power to interna-
tional institutions? First of all, following a broad institutionalist consensus in 
current political cosmopolitanism, international institutions are indispensable 
parts of a global governance regime for a world characterized by the intercon-
nectedness of social transactions, i.e. functional interdependence. Echoing the 
ideas from writings nearly a century old in IR theory and economics (cf. Baldwin 
1980, Zürn 2002), the political significance of interdependence can be under-
stood in a number of ways. The first is “globalization”, that is “the intensification 
of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that 
local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa” (Giddens 1990: 64, Beisheim et al. 1999). According to this view, the 
transnational flow of goods, services, communications or people has a tremen-
dous influence on the distribution of life chances all over the globe (Kapstein 
2000, Scheve and Slaughter 2004). By creating a plethora of risks and opportuni-
ties, national communities are gradually transforming into a plurality of trans-
national (border transcending) “communities of fate” (Held 1997; for a similar 
argument, see Habermas 1998, Beck 2004, Bohman 2007). What thus becomes 
politically problematic is first of all “sensitivity interdependence” (Keohane and 
Nye, Jr. 1977, Baldwin 1980), i.e. the costs attached to mutual influences that are 
expected to shape and synchronize political agendas significantly in terms of 
transnational risks and crises (Beck 1999). Following this line of reasoning, 
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international institutions become desirable, then, because some of “the most 
fundamental forces and processes which determine the nature of life chances 
within and across political communities are now beyond the reach of individual 
nation-states” (Held et al. 1998: 21). Put differently, societies have become 
vulnerable (Keohane and Nye, Jr. 1977: 13) to the costs imposed by globalization, 
because national governments are incapable of regulating the transnational 
exchange of goods and bads (Cooper 1968, Rodrik 1997, Sassen 1998), and deliv-
ering “global public goods” (Kaul et al. 1999) unilaterally. Thus it is assumed that 
globalization not only defines the agenda of public issues, but also compels and 
propels the “advocacy of regional and global governance and [the] creation of 
political organizations and mechanisms that would provide a framework of 
regulation and law enforcement across the globe” (Held 2003: 523, similarly 
Habermas 1998: ch. 4, Zürn 2004). 
Nevertheless, globalization as a source of functional interdependence is just one 
reason for political cosmopolitans to think carefully about the redistribution of 
regulative power from the national to the international level; a second is moral 
interdependence. From the vantage point of current cosmopolitanism, human 
suffering, inequality and oppression are problematic even without any economic 
or social transactions that impose material costs on agents somewhere else in 
the world. In this vein, political cosmopolitans build on a universalist ethic 
drawing upon a much broader tradition of cosmopolitanism, namely, the “ac-
knowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically 
into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this 
humanity” (Lu 2000: 245). Although some ethical accounts of cosmopolitanism 
have rightly been criticized for being apolitical (Dallmayr 2003: 434), the idea of 
moral interdependence has led to similar conclusions about the desirability of 
international institutions. Insofar as nation states have proven to leave the 
world vulnerable to a plethora of injustices, international institutional capacities 
are seen as highly desirable because they help us to implement human rights, 
fulfill our responsibility to protect or establish fairness in international trade 
(Pogge 1994, Zürn 2000, Dallmayr 2003, Kapstein 2000, Young 2004, Bohman 
2007). In sum, then, much of current political cosmopolitan thinking is based 
upon an implicit duality of functional and moral interdependence to which these 
theorists appeal in making their case for international institutions. Here, the 
advocacy for international institutions hinges on the suspicion that the nation 
state is unable to efficiently tackle problems that arise as a result of interde-
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pendence—be it in terms of costs of globalization or rising commitments toward 
a global public good. 
It is important to note that the cosmopolitan case for internationalized govern-
ance typically goes beyond this argument of mere comparative efficiency on the 
“output side” (Scharpf 1997) of different institutional levels. International 
institutions are also deemed desirable as a means to secure the “congruence 
between decision-makers and decision-takers” (Held 2004: 371) of political 
authority. Consequently, international institutions find support only to the 
extent to which they enable and ensure the effective inclusion of all those 
affected by political decisions on the “input side” of global governance, in order 
to hold authorities truly accountable (Pogge 1994, Kaul et al. 2003, Grant and 
Keohane 2005, Karlsson 2008). It is for this very reason that contemporary 
cosmopolitans forcefully reject the idea of a highly centralized world state; 
rather, they envisage a multi-level system of governance in which “a division of 
powers and competences is recognized at different levels of political interaction 
and interconnectedness—levels which correspond to the degree to which public 
issues stretch across and affect populations” (Held 1995: 236). Because the dele-
gation of power to international institutions implies, ceteris paribus, a compara-
bly low “capacity of the citizen to participate effectively in governing” (Dahl 
1999: 22), some explicit notion of subsidiarity informs most writing of political 
cosmopolitans (Pogge 1994, Held 1995, Kolers 2006, Bohman 2007). The empow-
erment of international institutions is justified only, it is assumed, in cases in 
which smaller institutions fail to deliver in terms of problem solving as well as 
inclusiveness. Decentralized deliberation and decision making is strongly pre-
ferred over the empowerment of a more centralized institution. Nevertheless it 
is widely acknowledged that a significant part of political authority must “move 
up the ladder” to the regional and ultimately global level because of growing 
transnational interdependence of a larger scope and the inefficiency of “smaller 
reach authorities” like the nation states which leave their citizens vulnerable. 
3. A “cosmopolitan” citizenry? State of research and hypotheses 
For theoretical as well as normative reasons it is important to understand to 
what extent and under what conditions people’s expectations shift toward 
internationalized governance, as argued above. So what do we already know 
about this? The fact that international institutions have to cope with an increas-
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ingly assertive transnational civil society is frequently understood to be a strong 
indicator for an emerging “cosmopolitan” citizenry who perceive problems 
globally and understand the importance of international institutions for solving 
them (Florini 2000, Anheier et al. 2001, Held 2002: 39, Young 2004). Although 
recent instances of high-profile activism may leave one with the immediate 
impression that a cosmopolitan citizenry is perhaps in the making (Zürn 2004, 
Tarrow 2005, Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2011 forthcoming), even the most 
euphoric observers must acknowledge, on deeper inspection, that this visible 
activism is far from ubiquitous, involving actually only a small subset of the 
world in terms of geographical and social scope. The weak representation of the 
political South is a case in point here (Jäger 2007). But even with respect to the 
highly industrialized countries of the political North, empirical evidence sug-
gests that this transnational civil society is actually an elite phenomenon (Fisher 
et al. 2005) which is far less a demonstration of widespread politicization than 
proponents of cosmopolitan democracy suggest. It is therefore important to 
focus more on popular orientations in order to understand how ordinary people 
reason about why and under what conditions a global level of political authority 
is desirable. 
To start with, do ordinary people perceive the world to be interconnected in 
terms of sensitivity interdependence? It is widely assumed that day-to-day 
experiences—be they firsthand or via the public media—have led to public 
perceptions of an extensively globalized world (Hannerz 1996, Rosenau 1997, 
Norris 2000). Indeed, globalization has entered the public discourse as the new 
buzzword and a variety of public opinion data suggest that most societies are 
already quite familiar with it (Eurobarometer 2004, Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005). 
Nevertheless, research on what globalization means to ordinary people is scarce. 
Among a number British focus groups Urry and Szerzinsky (2002) found “a 
strong awareness of the global flows of money, commodities and pollution; of 
extended relations connecting them to other peoples, places and environments” 
(p. 472). Up to now, however, how the different perceptions of interconnected-
ness relate to the public definition of risks or opportunities (i.e. interdependence 
as sensitivity) has not been researched systematically. Evidence from public 
opinion research suggests that a majority in the OECD world evaluate globaliza-
tion to be overall “a good thing”; nevertheless a significant share of the respon-
dents shows at least some ambivalence or a negative attitude toward globaliza-
tion (PEW 2007). Such results seem to be in accordance with cosmopolitan prem-
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ises inferring a widespread understanding “of overlapping ‘collective fortunes’” 
(Held 2002: 38) in the respective societies. This non-specific evaluation of global-
ization is nevertheless not very telling and needs more thorough analysis in 
terms of specific policy areas and institutional implications. 
To start with, survey research has repeatedly shown that most societies tend to 
support internationalized governance (Norris 2000, PEW 2003, WorldPublic 
Opinion.org 2007, Furia 2005). But in order to determine whether such support is 
due to a process of cosmopolitan politicization, we have to look for empirical 
relationships between perceptions of interdependence and the proclaimed shift 
of institutional demand from the national to the international level. Again, 
political cosmopolitanism assumes that international institutions are an impor-
tant (and legitimate) political means of problem solving whenever issues are 
scaled up to the extent that the unilateral action of an individual nation state is 
insufficient to resolve them. But can we really expect ordinary citizens to be 
knowledgeable about such complex processes? Do they really reason along these 
lines of cosmopolitanism? Indeed, some initial evidence gives us reason to think 
that this might be so. Research on the economic voting problematique has 
successfully demonstrated that economic interdependence (in terms of integra-
tion of a specific society into the global economic system) dampens the strength 
of economic voting. Citizens begin to devalue economic performance as an 
indicator of their government’s functional capability or efficiency, if economic 
interconnectedness is (or is perceived to be) strong (Hellwig 2001, 2007, 
Fernández-Albertos 2006, Hellwig et al. 2008). Nevertheless, whether this rela-
tionship holds for other problem areas or is complemented by a significant rise 
in expectations vis-à-vis international institutions has, to my knowledge, not 
yet been investigated. 
The same holds for the case of moral interdependence. Whether globalization 
ultimately leads to a broader scope of identities and commitments has been 
widely debated. The intuitive assumption is that a multiplicity of experiences 
and images can lead to an individual’s adopting a state of multiple belongingness 
to local, national, transnational communities or even humanity as whole. Never-
theless, many observers have pointed to the converse of this, namely, a 
strengthening of ethnocentric tendencies, chauvinism, and even xenophobia 
(Rosenau 2003, Kriesi et al. 2008). In this context, Eurobarometer research has 
been somewhat inconclusive regarding whether or not we are currently wit-
nessing a growing sense of European identity (Duchesne and Frognier 1995, 
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Deflem and Pampel 1996, Wessels 2007). In the same vein, research has success-
fully demonstrated that popular attachment to humanity as a whole is wide-
spread and therefore less elitist than often expected (Furia 2005). But again, 
whether or not we are actually witnessing a positive development toward 
cosmopolitan identity is clearly debatable and hinges in turn on whether one 
interprets the cosmopolitanism of younger respondents as a matter of genera-
tional and life-long affiliation (Norris 2000) or a life-cycle trend doomed to 
decline with age (Jung 2008). Research on cosmopolitan orientations has shown 
that a sense of global belongingness correlates positively with support for 
international institutions like the UN (Norris 2000, Furia 2005). According to the 
cosmopolitan position outlined above, this could be an indicator for citizens’ 
favouring internationalized governance, fuelled by moral concerns about global 
inequality, oppression, or human suffering. Nevertheless, existing evidence is 
partial at best, because it cannot shed any light upon whether this support has 
anything to do with the attributed capability of institutions to resolve such 
issues. 
Taken together, the state of research is inconclusive with respect to the specific 
causalities that underlie a shift in public expectations toward the international 
level. In accordance with my reading of cosmopolitanism I expect citizens’ 
beliefs to be internally linked according to what I term the “interdependence 
model” of cosmopolitan politicization. In its most basic formulation I understand 
this model only to differentiate between the national and the international level, 
leaving the question of a stratified multi-level polity unspecified. Thus it cap-
tures the essence of cosmopolitan intuition, namely that a high level of interde-
pendence across national-boarders nurtures hopes that internationalized gov-
ernance can solve problems efficiently. 
H1: Perceptions of (a) functional and (b) moral interdependence of a transna-
tional scope foster the belief that the internationalization of governance is 
desirable because of the problem solving capacity of international institu-
tions. 
This hypothesis constitutes the baseline of the interdependence model of cosmo-
politan politicization. Moving beyond this simplified distinction of national-
international, one may nevertheless wonder whether the assumed link applies 
consistently over different levels of regional and global governance. A more 
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elaborate—and cognitively demanding—version of the interdependence model 
is captured in the second hypothesis. 
H2: (a) Perceived global interdependence leads to a shift of expectations to-
ward the global level, while (b) perceived European interdependence works in 
favour of a perceived problem solving capability of European institutions. 
The cosmopolitan emphasis on vulnerabilities suggests that beliefs about the 
inefficacy of nation states at solving transnational problems constitute a scope 
condition of the proclaimed upward shift in public expectations toward a multi-
level system of governance. I thus consider the interdependence model to be 
conditional on the perception of significant “vulnerability”—defined as a nation 
state’s lack of problem solving capabilities. 
H3: Beliefs about nation states’ inefficiencies moderate the relationship be-
tween interdependence perceptions and beliefs about the problem solving ca-
pability of internationalized governance. That is, the relationship is stronger, 
the more vulnerable citizens perceive themselves to be—i.e. the less problem 
solving capability they attribute to the nation state. 
But we usually expect a cosmopolitan belief system to be conditional on cogni-
tive mobilization, too. Most notably, James Rosenau (2003) has emphasized an 
ongoing “skill revolution” which he plausibly expects to expand “people’s hori-
zons on a global scale” (pp. 52 232 ff, Inglehart 1997). Therefore it is reasonable 
to expect interdependency perceptions to be positively related to “skills” and 
other similar mechanisms of cognitive mobilization like “education”. Most 
notably Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) have argued that education implies an 
exposure to economic discourses which favour a specific understanding of the 
social as globalized and complex. Their focus on economic ideas can be extended 
to the perception of interdependencies and universal norms like human rights, 
which are part of the curricula of schools and universities in most democracies. 
In line with the interdependence model are a variety of studies which have 
shown that more educated individuals tend to lend greater support to interna-
tional institutions (Inglehart 1970, Furia 2005, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), 
although these results are disputed by others like Janssen (1991), or Gabel 
(1998). From the perspective of the interdependence model this might suggest 
that the model holds over different levels of cognitive mobilization, such that 
the less skilled tend to expect less from international institutions because they 
do not perceive problems to be as globalized as the more skilled do. 
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According to Rosenau (2003), however, this cannot be simply taken as a given. 
The less skilled are expected to feel cognitively overwhelmed by perceived 
complexities and insecurities associated with global developments and to be 
especially prone to retreating to what he calls “private worlds” that are “marked 
by either alienation or passivity and are thus conceived as so disassociated from 
public affairs that they are not in any local or global world” (p. 42). What we can 
infer from this is that, given a particular lack of skills, the possibility exists that 
interdependence perceptions may not foster beliefs in the capabilities of institu-
tions to steer globalization, but rather cynicism. Such a process would be obvi-
ously of acute importance for the theoretical as well as the normative reasons 
outlined above, because a “retreat to private worlds” implies a process of cosmo-
politan “depoliticization”, which would clearly undermine the formation of a 
cosmopolitan citizenry supportive of internationalized governance. In light of 
this situation, I venture a last hypothesis that captures the intuition that skills 
determine a second critical scope condition of cosmopolitan politicization. 
H4: Relationships between beliefs in the problem solving capability of inter-
national institutions and perceptions of (a) functional or (b) moral interde-
pendence depend on the level of skills. 
4. Data and method 
The interdependence model and related hypotheses about its scope conditions 
are tested using data from a representative survey of the German citizenry 
(Ecker-Ehrhardt et al. 2008).1 This data is distinguished from that of previous 
research by its coverage of and comprehensiveness vis-à-vis interdependency 
perceptions and ascribed problem solving capabilities of a variety of interna-
tional institutions. At the same time, the data is limited to just the German 
population. While the German case might be interesting in its own right, most 
research in this area favours comparative designs of the widest possible scope in 
terms of geography, economic development, and culture—and this for good 
                                                     
1 The survey was commissioned by a group of researchers at the Social Science Research Center 
Berlin (Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, Wolfgang Merkel, Bernhard Wessels and Michael Zürn). Due to 
the complexity of the topic computer assisted personal (face-to-face) interviews (CAPI) were 
chosen. These were conducted by TNS Emnid Political and Social Research, a major German 
pollster. Results from a pre-test of about 30 interviews led to slight revisions of the instru-
ment. Finally, a random, probabilistic sample of 4736 German adult citizens was selected of 
which 1560 were successfully interviewed (representing a 32.9 percent response rate) between 
14 December 2007 and 21 January 2008. 
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reason (Norris 2000, Furia 2005, Jung 2008): to research cosmopolitanism as a 
social fact, it is argued, research gains by being as cosmopolitan as possible (Beck 
2004). Nevertheless, I argue that we still can learn important things from a case 
study (Gerring 2007). Comparative research has demonstrated that many of the 
mechanisms that shape political attitudes are not unique to single societies but 
indeed have a general quality with respect to European societies (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993, Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995, Mau et al. 2008), the OECD world of 
advanced industrial societies (Dalton 2004, Inglehart 1997) and even beyond 
(Inglehart 2000, Norris 1999). Hence, I assume the German case to be a typical 
exemplar of European societies as regards its basic mechanisms of attitude 
formation. Moreover, I claim a significant degree of representativeness even vis-
à-vis the larger population of advanced industrial societies. I invite further 
research to review this claim critically and hopefully increase our understand-
ing through an inclusion of substantially different cases—especially from the 
least developed societies—and more diverse cultural settings.  
Hypotheses are tested by regressing beliefs in the capability of international 
institutions to solve problems (“capability beliefs”) on measures of sensitivity 
perceptions, transnational commitments and a set of controls. Each of the meas-
ures used are discussed in turn; descriptives like mean, standard deviation and 
range are reported in the appendix (table 4). To start with, measures on capability 
beliefs are based on responses to the following question:  
Which institution do you think would be most appropriate for solving the fol-
lowing problems: (a) the German Federal Government, (b) a non-
governmental organization, (c) a big corporation, (d) the European Union or 
(e) another international institution or actor? How about [issue area]? 
For cases in which the respondents chose e, a list of six further options was 
presented: the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
International Monetary Fund (IWF) and the World Economic Summit Group of 8 
(G8), the United States, and “others”. Multiple selections were explicitly allowed. 
This procedure resulted in a comprehensive matrix of 14 issue areas and 14 
institutional options. The filtering logic of our question design was clearly on the 
mark, as our interviewers reported high accessibility of the questions. A set of 
14 issue specific measures labelled Global capabilities (specific) count all men-
tions of the UN, WTO, IWF, G8 and the residual category “other international 
institutions” for one of the 14 issue areas (range 0 to 5). Additionally, an aggre-
Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt • Problem Perception and Public Expectations in International Institutions 12
 
 
gated measure labelled Global capabilities (general) is computed by counting 
respective mentions of institutions across all issue areas (range 0 to 70). To test 
for the more elaborated multi-level variant of the interdependence model, an 
additional measure labelled European capabilities (general) counts mentions of 
the main regional institution, viz. the European Union, over all issue areas.  
The first set of explanatory variables measures perceptions of functional sensitiv-
ity. I define functional sensitivity contextually in terms of dependence, i.e. “[the] 
state of being determined or significantly affected by external force” (Keohane 
and Nye, Jr. 1977: 8). Put in this way, the operationalization of sensitivity per-
ceptions of German respondents is straightforward. The question used from the 
survey reads as follows: 
Some people say that problems and processes in other countries have a 
strong influence on our situation here in Germany; others say that problems 
and processes in other countries have no influence on us. What kind of an 
impact do you think these problems in other countries have on the situation 
here in Germany—very big, big, medium, little or no influence at all? 
This question was posed separately for 14 problem areas. Respondents were then 
asked to indicate which regions they thought would be especially important 
(“besonders wichtig”) in this regard. In this case the question was posed for a 
reduced list of issue areas: only those areas were selected for which the respon-
dent had previously stated that the influence on the situation in Germany was 
very strong, strong or medium. Respondents could choose between Europe, 
America, Asia and Africa as sources for the influence in question. 
Measures of sensitivity interdependence count mentions of regions from which 
respondents perceive a medium, strong or very strong influence on the situation 
in Germany. A first set of issue specific measures labelled transnational sensitiv-
ity (specific) count mentions of Europe, Africa, America and Asia for each issue 
area separately. A second set of generalized measures count mentions of regions 
over issue areas. Transnational sensitivity (general) counts mentions of all regions 
across issue areas; the second and third measures differentiate between per-
ceived influences from Europe (European sensitivity) and non-European regions 
(global sensitivity). All sensitivity measures have been recoded to range from 0 to 
1. 
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Measures of normative interdependence: As already mentioned, cosmopolitanism 
usually operates with the idea of universal commitments. Consequently cosmo-
politans have been prominently identified as those “whose primary allegiance is 
to the community of human beings in the entire world” (Nussbaum 1994: 3). 
Although cosmopolitanism seems to identify universal rights as the most power-
ful source of such allegiances (Lu 2000), a variety of communitarian writers have 
distanced themselves from such a view by pointing to the greater importance of 
more particular loyalties (see Erskine 2007 for a comprehensive discussion). 
Both camps focus on different modes of allegiances—ethical ones versus those 
fostered by group attachments—and their respective scopes. But we cannot rule 
out the case that some people will define international justice in terms of a 
“larger loyalty to the human species” (Rorty 1998); nor should we neglect the 
fact that people tend to apply a variety of norms selectively to local groups or 
fellow nationals (Lu 2000, Duchesne and Frognier 1995, Jung 2008). Accordingly, 
it was decided to ask our respondents about their normative obligations and 
affective attachments for a variety of levels, taking the cosmopolitan-
communitarian dispute as starting point for a two-dimensional typology of 
origin and scope of allegiances. 
For the “origin” dimension we identified two widely debated norms which are 
likely to indicate different levels of ethical interdependence. The first is the 
norm to assist someone else who is in desperate need. With respect to transna-
tional politics, the moral significance of similar or related obligations is the 
starting point for a variety of humanitarian agencies and large-scale private 
donorship. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate about whether the interna-
tional community has the “responsibility to protect” the populations of other 
states, especially if their own respective governments fail to protect them from 
harm in the event of war, catastrophe, or widespread suffering (International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001, Linklater 2007). 
We expect the “duty to assist” (Rawls 1999) to be a highly accessible norm and an 
essential part of “minimal morality” (Walzer 1985) for many people. This as-
sumption is supported by empirical research on individual motivations and 
helping behaviour (Montada et al. 1986, Bierhoff 2002). Thus the interviewees in 
our survey were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following 
statement(s): 
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I have a special moral duty to help other Germans/other Europeans/other 
people in the world who, through no fault of their own, have been thrust into 
a situation of severe hardship (sehr große Not). 
Political cosmopolitanism is most often identified with the perspective that “sees 
new political institutions as fundamental in addressing concerns for global 
justice” (Bohman 2007: 11). However, as Thomas Pogge (2001) has repeatedly 
argued, an obligation to assist nevertheless fails to address the issue of an unfair 
or unjust international order. John Rawls’ (1993) original notion of “justice as 
fairness” elaborates a cosmopolitan responsibility to change the international 
order itself, to make it just—i.e. to give everybody a fair chance to live under 
humane conditions. Such reasoning coincides with important arguments of 
those who identify themselves as part of the “global justice movement” (della 
Porta 2007); the basic rationale behind the notion of “justice qua equality of 
opportunities” is also a familiar topic in psychology research (Reichle and 
Schmitt 1998, Ross and Miller 2002), which has already demonstrated its empiri-
cal importance on the individual level (Montada et al. 1986). In other words, the 
norm of “equality of opportunities” is likely to be a source of empirical obliga-
tion. We formulated the following question(s) to indicate individual internaliza-
tion of this norm: 
I have a special moral duty to make sure that all people in Germany/in 
Europe/in the world have the same opportunity to be able to live well. 
To be sure, this set of questions and the one above do not exhaust the palette of 
norms that may populate the universe of public morality. I nevertheless claim 
that they can be used in a valid and accessible way to indicate major tendencies 
as regards defining moral obligations with respect to different levels of “group-
ness.” Moreover, to complement the notion of affective-driven loyalties, we 
opted for a slightly reformulated version of the Eurobarometer question on 
personal attachments or affinities: 
Some people claim that they feel a special bond to Germans, Europeans or 
simply all of the people in the world; others claim, to the contrary, that they 
have very little or no such feelings toward any of these groups. Please tell me 
how strongly associated you feel to the following groups of people. How 
strong a bond do you feel to Germans/Europeans/all people regardless of 
which country or part of the world they come from? 
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I constructed three measures of moral commitment based on the six variables 
representing “wider than national” obligations (viz. European, other/all people in 
the world)—a duty to assist, equal opportunities, and sense of belongingness. 
The transnational commitments index aggregates the values of all six variables. 
To test for the multi-level variant of the interdependence model (H2) measures 
for European commitments and global commitments indexes are computed by 
aggregating the values of the three variables of the respective levels. All meas-
ures range from 0 to 1; they are one-dimensional and show a high level of 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0.77 to 0.86; the items 
correlate highly with the constructed scales, with r ranging from .62 to .87). 
Nevertheless it has to be acknowledged that correlation between measures of 
regional and global commitments are high enough (r = 0.84, p < 0.001) to nurture 
doubts about whether respondents discriminate significantly between wider 
than national commitments. This is of obvious relevance for the evaluation of 
the more elaborate version of the interdependence model captured by H2, which 
assumes such a discrimination to make the case for consistent application of the 
interdependence model over different levels; I will return to this issue subse-
quently. 
As controls I use the level of education as a proxy for cognitive skills (cf. Ingle-
hart 1997, Rosenau 2003). The first dummy variable indicates respondents who 
have successfully passed the German secondary school completion examination, 
the Abitur; the second indicates those respondents who hold a university degree 
(which presupposes the Abitur in the German educational system). To account for 
vulnerability that derives from a lack of problem solving power on the national 
level, I construct a measure which counts all non-mentions of the German 
Federal Government across issue areas. Moreover, perceptions of the problem 
solving capability of internationalized governance as discussed above are explic-
itly differentiated from an overall satisfaction with specific institutions. I there-
fore control for overall satisfaction by using responses to the following sets of 
questions: 
All in all, how satisfied are you with the work of the following institutions 
and actors. Are you completely satisfied, more satisfied than not, more dis-
satisfied than not, completely dissatisfied? 
For overall satisfaction with global institutions, the values of the items for the 
EU, UN, WTO and G8 are added and rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Additional 
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controls are two variables on ideology: right ideology is measure by using re-
spondents’ self-placement on an eleven-point left-to-right scale; postmaterialism 
is measured by Inglehart’s four-item version of the scale. Finally, gender (male = 
1, female = 0) and age (in years) are introduced. (Again, information on the 
univariate distribution of measures used in the following models can be found in 
the appendix, table 4.) 
With respect to model specification, all measures of perceived problem solving 
capability show the characteristic distribution of event count data with many 
zeros (as the modal value) and a decreasing density the higher the values. There-
fore analyses are performed using Poisson regression and its generalized ver-
sion—negative binomial—which allows for over-dispersion (cf. King 1989). Test 
statistics (α-coefficients) indicate whether this more demanding specification is 
preferable; estimates for regular Poisson models are presented otherwise (indi-
cated by a “–” in the α-cell). Given the theoretical focus of the paper, estimates 
of the control variables are only examined if they are of theoretical interest. 
5. Do citizens form attitudes according to the “interdependence 
model”? 
I begin with an area specific test of H1a, i.e. the conjecture that perceptions of 
transnational sensitivity could foster the belief that international institutions in 
general are best at solving problems. According to this aspect of the interde-
pendence model (outlined above), then, it is to be expected that the number of 
mentions of global institutions as the “most capable … to solve problems” relates 
positively to perceptions of transnational sensitivity, i.e. the number of world 
regions from which respondents perceive an influence on the situation in 
Germany. Moreover, empirical evidence would be most convincing if (a) it sug-
gests that this relationship functions thus in a variety of important issue areas 
and (b) if it functions issue specifically, i.e. in accordance with precisely defined 
problems and institutional capabilities. Table 3 presents estimates for a set of 
issue specific models that capture this logic of inference. Leaving the case of 
regional governance aside for the moment, I use the variable set global capabili-
ties (specific) as the dependent variables, i.e. perceived problem solving capabil-
ity of global institutions in specific issue areas. Presented in table 1 are those 
seven issue areas for which the greatest share of respondents perceived a 
transnational influence on Germany. Regression results strongly support H1a, 
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because the coefficients indicate a substantial, statistically significant relation-
ship between perceptions of issue specific sensitivity and capability beliefs 
across the board. For example, estimates suggest that beliefs in institutional 
capability to solve economic problems increases by 52 percent for every addi-
tional region from which respondents perceive an influence on the German 
economy (holding all other variables constant). The respective percentages range 
from 34 to 35 for environmental problems, migration and criminality and from 
18 to 14 for terrorism, peace and refugees. 
Although the results for these areas might be the most interesting for propo-
nents of political cosmopolitanism which focuses on economic globalization, 
environmental protection, migration and security issues, to make their case for 
internationalized governance, it should be pointed out that the interdependence 
model also holds for the rest of the 14 issue areas covered by the survey in 
almost the same way (as regards e.g. size of coefficients ranging between .416 
and 1.575, all p > 0.001). Therefore it seems safe to conclude that the interde-
pendence model captures an important part of the empirical reality, at least with 
respect to the German citizenry and their perceptions of sensitivity interde-
pendence. 
To move on to a test of the normative part of the “interdependence model”—i.e. 
the conjecture that transnational commitments foster a shift of expectations to 
the international level (H1b)—I estimate a set of simplified models with the 
aggregated measure of global capabilities across all 14 issue areas. The results are 
in line with expectations. While of less substantial relevance then transnational 
sensitivity, commitments play a significant role in shifting public expectations 
to the international level: According to my estimates, beliefs in global capabili-
ties increases by 9 percent for a standard deviation increase in transnational 
commitments. As before, beliefs in the problem solving capability of global 
institutions go up substantially if respondents perceive transnational sensitivity 
(about 42.9 percent for a standard deviation increase in sensitivity). Taken 
together these results strongly confirm my intuition that citizens may “tick” 
according to the interdependence model in its basic formulation (H1). 
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Table 1—Global capabilities and transnational sensitivity: area specific models 
 
Economy 
1 
Environ-
ment 
2 
Migration 
3 
Terrorism 
4 
Criminality 
5 
Peace 
6 
Refugees 
7 
        
Transnational sensitivity 1.317*** 0.994*** 1.000*** 0.660*** 1.017*** 0.559*** 0.596*** 
 (0.134) (0.112) (0.177) (0.095) (0.163) (0.086) (0.140) 
        
Overall satisfaction -0.312 0.132 -0.169 0.058 0.256 0.153 -0.057 
 (0.230) (0.208) (0.260) (0.163) (0.283) (0.147) (0.204) 
        
Secondary school (Abi-
tur) 
0.573*** 0.274* 0.058 0.163 0.466** 0.150* 0.053 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.143) (0.085) (0.154) (0.074) (0.109) 
        
University 0.008 0.100 0.348* 0.028 0.157 0.051 0.382** 
 (0.117) (0.132) (0.163) (0.098) (0.171) (0.085) (0.123) 
        
Right ideology -0.074 0.078 -0.071 -0.168 0.307 0.023 -0.072 
 (0.197) (0.185) (0.231) (0.151) (0.257) (0.131) (0.179) 
        
Postmaterialism 0.055 0.031 0.147 0.207* -0.081 0.178* 0.131 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.153) (0.100) (0.168) (0.087) (0.119) 
        
Age (years) 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Male -0.039 0.132 0.007 -0.004 -0.115 0.022 0.056 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.101) (0.063) (0.109) (0.057) (0.076) 
        
Constant -1.109*** -1.236*** -1.157*** -0.624*** -1.763*** -0.593*** -0.766*** 
 (0.230) (0.232) (0.267) (0.171) (0.284) (0.151) (0.208) 
        
Wald chi² 178.537*** 112.555*** 47.829*** 69.269*** 72.436*** 59.480*** 45.574*** 
        
Overdispersion (α) - 0.358*** - - - - 0.247*** 
        
Number of observations 1371 1371 1370 1364 1367 1366 1369 
        
Log pseudo-likelihood -1580.07 -1448.74 -1136.30 -1563.38 -1021.60 -1670.04 -1441.89 
        
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < = .05 **p < = .01 ***p < = .001 (two-tailed tests). 
As discussed above, the internationalization of governance is most often justified 
with reference to the assumption that the nation state fails to tackle important 
problems in times of globalization. Vulnerability—the lack of the nation state’s 
capability to solve problems—has thus been proposed as a possible scope condi-
tion of the interdependence model (H3). I argue that, if citizens believe that their 
government has all of the possibilities to solve pressing problems, then expecta-
tions may not shift (or at least not with the same intensity) to the international 
level, even if transnational interdependencies are perceived to a significant ex-
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tent. Turning to the vulnerability models in table 2, there is indeed some evi-
dence which supports this notion. To start with, the coefficients of sensitivity 
measures are compared over subgroups of respondents who hold above-average 
or below-average beliefs in the problem solving capability of the German Fed-
eral Government. The coefficients are both positive and significant, but vary 
substantially: The estimated coefficient for the over-average subgroup indicates 
a 39 percent change towards stronger beliefs in the problem solving capability 
of global institutions per 0.1 change in perceived transnational sensitivity (i.e. 
10 percent of its range), while the respective effect in the below-average sub-
group is twice as large at about 86 percent. This difference translates into a sig-
nificant positive effect of vulnerability on the relationship between sensitivity 
and the dependent variable (model 4). Given that below average beliefs in gov-
ernmental capability indicate high vulnerability, this strongly suggests that the 
explanatory power of the interdependence model is indeed more pronounced 
among more “vulnerable” citizens. Nevertheless, this cannot be confirmed for 
normative interdependence. Here, the difference in estimated coefficients over 
subgroups is small and not in line with expectations. Results from the respective 
interaction model show that this difference does not indicate a significant inter-
action between vulnerability and normative interdependence. Therefore, we can 
conclude that vulnerability moderates the relationship, but only with respect to 
functional interdependence and not in terms of an overall constraining scope 
condition. 
Turning to the “skill models”, results yield a similar picture (table 2). To recall 
the argument underlying H4, it was argued that the less educated may feel 
overwhelmed by the perceived complexities of a globalized world. Instead of 
shifting expectations about capable institutions upward, they may loose confi-
dence altogether in the possibility of efficiently steering social processes by 
means of political regulation. This expectation is tested using information about 
respondents who did or did not successfully complete secondary school. The 
comparisons of estimated coefficients over subgroups suggest a substantial dif-
ference in the interdependence model’s explanatory power. In accordance with 
H4 less well-educated respondents diverge with respect to relationships between 
perceived sensitivity and capability beliefs. Nevertheless, this difference—
although substantial and significant—seems to be unproblematic from the nor-
mative point of view of political cosmopolitanism: sensitivity relates signifi-
cantly to stronger beliefs in the problem solving capability of internationalized 
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governance. The same holds for normative interdependence. Even in the case of 
the less well-educated we find a strong and significant effect of transnational 
commitments. The skills models therefore yield more good news for political 
cosmopolitanism, despite the difference in explanatory power of the interde-
pendence model. A further divide between different levels of cognitive mobiliza-
tion is worthy of note: the better educated show more favourable beliefs about 
the capability of global institutions than do the less well-educated (at least in 
terms of secondary schooling, but not with respect to higher education). Thus 
James Rosenau’s notion of the “cynicism of the unskilled” finds empirical sup-
port, even if the interdependence mechanism of cosmopolitan politicization op-
erates irrespective of levels of cognitive skills. 
The insignificant (but still positive) coefficient estimated for the better educated 
subgroup is surprising and deserves some additional attention. A closer inspec-
tion of the data reveals a plausible reason for the deficiency in explanatory 
power of transnational commitments with respect to this subgroup. The esti-
mated effect of transnational commitments in the aggregated model rests almost 
completely on the difference in capability beliefs between the weakly or un-
committed and the rest of respondents (who do not differ significantly regarding 
their capability beliefs, irrespective of whether they hold moderate, strong or 
even very strong transnational commitments). This results in a lack of covari-
ance between capability beliefs and transnational commitments in the case of 
the well educated respondents, because this group shows a significantly lower 
proportion of uncommitted respondents by almost 50 percent (in the Abitur sub-
group 21.1 percent of respondents have commitment values between 0 and .25; 
in the subgroup without the Abitur only 10.3 percent of respondents fall in this 
range of weakly committed). In other words, if education is held constant on a 
high level, we control for a critical amount of variance in the explanatory vari-
able. I therefore take the small and insignificant (due to a low number of obser-
vations) estimate for transnational commitments among the Abiturienten as un-
problematic with respect to the acclaimed explanatory power of the interde-
pendence model as such. 
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Table 2—Testing for scope conditions: skills and vulnerability 
Vulnerability-Models Skills-Models 
Governmental 
capability Abitur 
 
Baseline 
model high low 
Interaction 
model No Yes 
Interaction 
model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Transnational sensitivity 1.802*** 1.596*** 2.259*** 1.856*** 1.579*** 2.322*** 1.818*** 
 (0.172) (0.263) (0.234) (0.177) (0.212) (0.282) (0.170) 
        
x Vulnerability    1.191*    
    (0.593)    
        
x Abitur       0.790* 
       (0.354) 
        
Transnational 
commitments 
0.412** 
(0.135) 
0.469* 
(0.211) 
0.376* 
(0.171) 
0.436** 
(0.136) 
0.571*** 
(0.166) 
0.131 
(0.237) 
0.428** 
(0.136) 
        
x Vulnerability    -0.365    
    (0.457)    
        
x Abitur       -0.438 
       (0.284) 
        
Vulnerability    0.147    
    (0.098)    
        
Secondary school (Abitur) 0.306*** (0.076) 
0.269* 
(0.115) 
0.278** 
(0.102) 
0.272*** 
(0.075)   
0.362*** 
(0.058) 
        
University 0.088 0.121 0.094 0.104    
 (0.085) (0.136) (0.107) (0.085)    
        
Overall satisfaction 0.012 0.295 -0.270 0.020 0.069 -0.166 0.009 
 (0.165) (0.253) (0.210) (0.167) (0.203) (0.271) (0.164) 
        
Right ideology 0.158 0.311 0.054 0.176 0.159 0.136 0.143 
 (0.140) (0.223) (0.180) (0.141) (0.176) (0.225) (0.139) 
        
Postmaterialism 0.118 0.240* -0.067 0.110 0.070 0.187 0.104 
 (0.084) (0.119) (0.120) (0.086) (0.106) (0.135) (0.084) 
        
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
        
Male 0.066 0.038 0.089 0.061 0.078 0.048 0.071 
 (0.055) (0.080) (0.075) (0.056) (0.069) (0.090) (0.055) 
        
Constant 0.833*** 
(0.176) 
0.626* 
(0.278) 
0.988*** 
(0.231) 
1.735*** 
(0.149) 
0.834*** 
(0.223) 
1.144*** 
(0.273) 
1.841*** 
(0.144) 
        
206.14*** 68.67*** 178.96*** 213.61*** 79.05*** 78.11*** 222.77*** Wald chi² 
       
Overdispersion (α) 1.070*** 1.451*** 0.664*** 1.064*** 1.284*** 0.704*** 1.065*** 
        
Number of observations 1292 699 593 1292 871 421 1292 
        
Log pseudo-likelihood -3960.90 -2141.79 -1782.35 -3958.17 -2565.78 -1375.72 -3958.70 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < = .05 **p < = .01 ***p < = .001 (two tailed tests). All interacting variables are centred before 
calculating product terms. 
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Thus far we have seen that the interdependence model is of significant explana-
tory power with respect to citizens’ beliefs in the problem solving capability of 
global-scale internationalized governance. I now turn to the final part of this 
analysis, the multi-level perspective and the question of whether citizens apply 
the interdependence model consistently over different levels of regional and 
global governance. To what extent do citizens differentiate between levels of in-
ternationalized governance and do they use their understanding of interdepend-
ence to form beliefs about the problem solving capability of these levels? Two 
expectations were formulated above: Perceived global interdependence should 
lead to a shift of expectations predominantly toward the global level (H2a), while 
perceived European interdependence is expected to work predominantly in fa-
vour of beliefs in the problem solving capability of European institutions (H2b). 
To test this extension of the interdependence model, interdependence calcula-
tions are introduced, which differentiate between the defined levels. Again, it 
should be noted that the normative obligations correlate strongly, which already 
points to a low degree of differentiation by respondents. To check for the ro-
bustness of estimates, a set of alternative models is specified with European and 
global measures separated and combined, respectively. 
In the first set of models the aggregated measure of beliefs in global capabilities 
used thus far are regressed on revised interdependence measures. Specified in 
this way, the estimates presented in table 3 strongly support H2. First of all, both 
coefficients for global interdependence measures are positive and significant. 
With respect to model 1, coefficients indicate a 41 percent change in capability 
beliefs per 0.1 increase in global sensitivity (range 0-1) and a 5.8 percent change 
for an additional 0.1 increase in global commitments (range 0-1). The European 
equivalents become irrelevant in the combined model. Strong correlations be-
tween commitment measures translate plausibly into the suppression of the 
significant relationships between the dependent and European commitment 
measures in model 2. The same mechanism can be inferred from the estimates 
vis-à-vis measures of sensitivity interdependence. Taken together, the multi-
level version of the interdependence model seems to capture a significant part 
of how beliefs in the problem solving capability of global institutions are dis-
tributed. 
In the second set of regression models, the applicability of the extended interde-
pendence model is tested with respect to the European Union. We are forced to 
acknowledge the fact that the measurement of general beliefs in the problem 
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solving capability of regionalized governance projected from beliefs about a sin-
gle institution is far from optimal. We should nevertheless expect the interde-
pendence model to work in this crucial case of regionalized governance. An in-
spection of the estimates for model 4 suggests that our expectations are borne 
out to some extent. The estimated coefficients suggest a 2.9 percent change in 
beliefs in the EU’s capability per 0.1 change in European sensitivity and a 3.8 
percent change for an additional 0.1 in global commitments. Estimates for the 
combined model 6, however, indicate that the initial inference from estimates 
may be biased, because global measures were omitted. Controlling for the multi-
level aspect of interdependence perceptions, results point to a significant role of 
global sensitivity, while the effect of European sensitivity vanishes. This clearly 
contradicts my expectations formulated in terms of an extended multi-level 
model. While one would expect public perceptions of regional interdependence 
ceteris paribus to foster beliefs in the problem solving capability of regional in-
stitutions, we see that such a process is not reflected in the data. Instead, we see 
that beliefs in EU’s problem solving power appear to be significantly related to 
the perception of external influences from non-European world regions, i.e. 
globalization. Whether this has to do with the EU’s public image of a “bulwark 
against globalization” is a determination beyond this paper. Because of the obvi-
ous limits of this crucial case for a thorough test of an extended multi-level in-
terdependence model, more evidence is needed to qualify doubts nurtured by the 
results presented here. 
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Table 3—The interdependence model in a multi-level setting 
 Global Capabilities European Capabilities (EU) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Sensitivity—global 1.627***  1.561***  0.826*** 0.798*** 
 (0.155)  (0.161)  (0.113) (0.117) 
       
Sensitivity—European  0.540*** 0.180 0.256**  0.081 
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.086)  (0.090) 
       
Commitments—global 0.462***  0.622*  0.198 -0.053 
 (0.125)  (0.243)  (0.112) (0.192) 
       
Commitments—European  0.439** -0.220 0.321**  0.310 
  (0.138) (0.259) (0.113)  (0.197) 
       
Overall satisfaction -0.040 0.027 -0.025 -0.143 -0.122 -0.138 
 (0.164) (0.175) (0.165) (0.099) (0.102) (0.102) 
       
Secondary school (Abitur) 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.295*** 0.027 0.045 0.049 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
       
University 0.089 0.097 0.091 0.136 0.115 0.111 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.087) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
       
Right ideology 0.120 0.089 0.135 -0.070 -0.076 -0.064 
 (0.139) (0.145) (0.140) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) 
       
Postmaterialism 0.108 0.096 0.107 -0.073 -0.058 -0.054 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.084) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
       
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Male 0.060 0.053 0.067 0.131** 0.148*** 0.139** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
       
constant 1.037*** 1.307*** 0.972*** 1.583*** 1.479*** 1.407*** 
 (0.166) (0.184) (0.182) (0.131) (0.123) (0.137) 
       
Wald chi² 209.486*** 86.988*** 213.792*** 42.308*** 85.187*** 85.142*** 
       
Overdispersion (α) - 1.163** - 0.836** 0.803** 0.801** 
       
Number of observations 1295 1300 1292 1289 1284 1281 
       
Log pseudo-likelihood -3968.31 -4029.49 -3956.99 -3807.25 -3775.08 -3767.22 
       
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < = .05 **p < = .01 ***p < = .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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6. Conclusions 
Findings speak for the central role of interdependence in how “ordinary people” 
make up their minds about global governance. The public view on international-
ized governance seems to match the interdependence model underlying most 
academic discourse, most notably IR institutionalism and political cosmopolitan-
ism. First, beliefs in the problem solving capability of global institutions are 
strongly related to the perception of transnational interdependence—be it in 
terms of functional sensitivity for an external influence on the domestic situa-
tion or normative obligations that cross boarders. Second, vulnerability has been 
shown to moderate this link to a significant extent. The more people think that 
their national government is inefficient in addressing problems, the stronger 
will be the correspondence between perceptions of interdependence and positive 
expectations towards global capabilities. Hence data supports my intuition that 
the interdependence model’s explanatory power is somehow conditional on the 
perception of significant vulnerability (defined as the lack of nation states prob-
lem solving capability). Third, even if we must acknowledge a tendency to be 
cynical about global institutions among the less educated, their views on inter-
nationalized governance nevertheless match the interdependence model to a 
remarkable extent: the more transnational the problems, the more global insti-
tutions are expected to address these problems efficiently. Therefore, a lack in 
cognitive mobilization (or “skill” as James Rosenau would have it) does not con-
stitute a critical scope condition of the interdependence model. 
The explanatory power of the interdependence model is good news for theoreti-
cal reasons, because it fills a void in current research on public opinion forma-
tion toward an emerging global polity. Nevertheless, even if this paper has suc-
cessfully probed the plausibility of the model with respect to global institutions, 
it has been only partially successful in explaining beliefs in the problem solving 
capability of the European Union, as the only regional institution under investi-
gation. The results for the regional level are puzzling in this respect. Perceptions 
of the EU’s problem solving capability can best be explained with respect to per-
ceived global interdependence, but the notion of “European interdependence” 
seems to have no comparable significance. In this way the interdependence 
model seems to capture the most basic story of an upward shift in public expec-
tations, but fails with respect to the attribution of capabilities in a multi-level-
structure of governance. Whether this is an outflow of the European (Union’s) 
specificities or applies to citizens’ views on regional governance in general is 
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beyond this paper. Future research will have to address this issue, to evaluate 
the explanatory power of the interdependence model in a world characterized by 
multi-level governance structures composed of national, regional and global in-
stitutions. 
These results are instructive for all of those academics who devote much 
thought to the possibility of a democratic world polity: Results suggest that or-
dinary people behave in a cosmopolitan way in the most basic and therefore 
most important sense of that notion. Given the preference of its major propo-
nents for subsidiarity as the structuring principle, the right level of political au-
thority is said to be conditional on the scope of problems in a “cosmopolitan de-
mocracy”. On this understanding, the cosmopolitan project may indeed be in line 
with a widely shared public understanding of how to distribute political author-
ity. Assuming that the process of globalization will continue, results suggest that 
a growing awareness of global interdependencies will cause the cosmopolitan 
part of society to grow in virtue of an ongoing process of “cosmopolitan politici-
zation”.  
The findings of this study point to at least three directions for future research: 
First, future studies will have to operate with a far more comprehensive set of 
institutions—preferably including a variety of local, national and regional 
forms—evaluated by survey respondents in terms of institutional problem solv-
ing capability and set in the context of respondents’ perceptions of the most 
pressing problems which society faces. Second, we should remain cautious about 
testing the interdependence model using a more cosmopolitan research design 
that permits comparative analysis over different spatial, temporal and cultural 
contexts. With both aspects borne in mind, the priority task will be to chart more 
fully and develop our theory further, on citizens’ understanding of transnational 
interdependencies and the most efficient way to tackle problems in view of 
these interdependencies. 
Finally, future research must place the interdependence model in the larger con-
text of political legitimacy issues. The low explanatory power of the interde-
pendence model with respect to the EU might already point to the fact that the 
model oversimplifies processes of opinion formation toward specific interna-
tional institutions which have become salient objects of public opinion. To some 
degree, a critical limitation of the model might be its focus on the output side of 
political legitimacy. More specifically, one may suspect cosmopolitan politiciza-
Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt • Problem Perception and Public Expectations in International Institutions 27
 
 
tion not only to be related to the rising overall awareness of international insti-
tutions’ capabilities, but probably also to the many criteria of good governance 
that these institutions fail to meet. Growing expectations towards international-
ized governance in terms of problem solving obviously do not preclude existing 
international institutions like the WTO, IMF or UNHCR becoming the objects of 
widespread criticism because of their lack of transparency, inclusiveness, or ac-
countability. On the contrary, growing beliefs in the problem solving capability 
of internationalized governance will presumably lead (and has already done so) 
to a significant increase in citizens’ expectations of prudent policy on the output 
side as well as democratic control on the input side (Scharpf 1997, Zürn 2004, 
Ecker-Ehrhardt and Wessels 2011 forthcoming). Hence future research should 
help us to understand to what degree the emergence of new centres of power on 
the global level spawns a desire for control by those affected, and set the stage 
for a comprehensive theory of public legitimacy of internationalized govern-
ance. 
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Appendix 
Table 4—Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variable Observa-tions Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Global capabilities indices (issue spe-
cific)      
Environmental protection 1526 0.623 0.931 0 5 
Poverty and hunger 1516 0.904 1.189 0 5 
Terrorism 1514 0.744 0.894 0 5 
Peace 1530 0.893 0.959 0 5 
Citizens and human rights 1530 0.535 0.797 0 5 
Economy 1521 0.713 1.111 0 5 
Migration 1521 0.388 0.740 0 5 
Refugees 1521 0.604 0.867 0 5 
Inflation 1517 0.640 0.999 0 5 
Education/illiteracy 1520 0.403 0.741 0 5 
Unemployment 1524 0.239 0.652 0 5 
Social inequality 1515 0.413 0.864 0 5 
Criminality 1512 0.333 0.676 0 5 
Consumer protection 1523 0.169 0.518 0 5 
      
Global capabilities index (general) 1450 7.570 7.991 0 70 
EU capability index (general) 1450 6.361 4.996 0 14 
      
Transnational Sensitivity indices (issue 
specific)      
Environmental protection 1534 0.542 0.355 0 1 
Poverty and hunger 1527 0.343 0.303 0 1 
Terrorism 1526 0.436 0.310 0 1 
Peace 1522 0.466 0.333 0 1 
Citizens and human rights 1527 0.360 0.334 0 1 
Economy 1533 0.502 0.298 0 1 
Migration 1527 0.405 0.271 0 1 
Refugees 1526 0.390 0.275 0 1 
Inflation 1512 0.370 0.281 0 1 
Education/illiteracy 1525 0.249 0.286 0 1 
Unemployment 1531 0.352 0.282 0 1 
Social inequality 1520 0.351 0.309 0 1 
Criminality 1528 0.426 0.314 0 1 
Consumer protection 1517 0.249 0.272 0 1 
      
Transnational sensitivity index (general) 1540 0.385 0.203 0 1 
Global sensitivity index (general) 1540 0.336 0.222 0 1 
European sensitivity index (general) 1540 0.532 0.285 0 1 
      
Transnational Commitment index 1490 0.482 0.217 0 1 
Global Commitment index 1495 0.458 0.232 0 1 
European Commitment index 1503 0.506 0.218 0 1 
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Variable Observa-tions Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Vulnerability index 1450 0.265 0.301 0 1 
Satisfaction w/ global Institutions 1516 0.485 0.187 0 .96 
Satisfaction w/ EU 1509 0.511 0.228 0 1 
Abitur 1545 0.312 0.463 0 1 
University 1545 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Male 1560 0.529 0.499 0 1 
Right ideology 1445 0.419 0.202 0 1 
Postmaterialism 1540 0.469 0.337 0 1 
Age 1560 46.181 15.921 18 89 
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